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"Malaysian plans are always political as much as
economic documents, but never more so than
this latest one."1
This statement in the widely read Far Eastern
Economic Review, reflects a factor in planning
that is often ignored or only dealt with in passing.
Between the statistics and tables of the Third
Malaysia Plan (TMP) lurks a whole number of
political statements on the development of the
Malaysian polity. The aim of this article is to
set the TMP in its political context and to high-
light trends of thinking within the Malaysian
political and bureaucratic leadership as they
grapple with the complex problems of a multi-
racial society, still deeply divided on many issues.
The subject of race is never far from the surface
of Malaysian politics, and it permeates the 430
pages of the TMP. Only recently the Minister
of Home Affairs and Internal Security, Tan Sri
Ghazali Shafle, castigated foreign journals for
continually dwelling on Malaysia's racial prob-
lems. Yet a plan prepared by his own government
admits that national unity is still far from a
reality (paras. 2 & 3)2 and that the race riots of
1969 are still a horrifying reminder of the knife-
edge situation with which Malaysians must con-
tend.
The publication of the TMP had been anticipated
in 1975 but did not appear until July, 1976, well
into the 1976-1980 plan period. The significance
of this delay was the subject of rumour in the
bars and night spots of Kuala Lumpur, and a
number of ingenious explanations were offered.
Government control of the press through the
issue of renewable licences ensures compliance
with directives on what can and what cannot
appear.3 The significant event was the death in
January, 1976, in London of the Prime Minister,
Tun Razak, and the appointment of Datuk
Hussein Onn as his successor. Razak's death was
a blow to the senior partner in the Barisan
1 Far Eastern Economic Review, August 27 1976, p. 42
2 Paragraph numbers in the text refer to the English Language
Edition of the Third Malaysia Pl an, Government Press,
Kuala Lumpur, 1976
3 The English language press in Malaysia seems more amenable
to Government pressure with the exception of regular con-
tributions in the 'Star' by the former Prime Minister, Tunku
Abdul Rahman, some cf which are more critical of Govern-
ment policy than is acceptable from any other writer. A
number of Malay language papers are also more critical than
the teme English language papers.
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Nasional (National Front) the United Malays
National Organisation (UMNO). Hussein Onn's
predecessors, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun
Razak, dominated the Malaysian political scene
and were both popular within UMNO. Hussein
Onn's reputation among many Malays is that of
a renegadea man who with his father had left
UMNO because of the failure of the party to
open its ranks to non-Malay citizens, and had
only returned to UMNO after a number of years
in the political wilderness. This very idea is
anathema to many Malays, who regard UMNO
as the ultimate in Malay political aspirations, and
to allow other races into its ranks would con-
stitute a betrayal of the Malay political heritage.
Thus whilst Rahman and Razak occupied an
unassailable position within UMNO, Hussein Onn
had to overcome the suspicion and opposition of
many people within the party. The delay in pub-
lishing the plan may well have been due to the
illness of Razak in the final months of l975,
and the desire of Hussein Onn to examine the
plan afresh after his assumption to office. A
number of points of emphasis in the TMP could
conceivably have resulted from the new Prime
Minister's revisions and these will be examined
in more detail later in this article.
As Prime Minister and Acting President of
UMNO, Hussein Onn also heads the Barisan
Nasional (BN). This organisation is the main
bargaining ground for the various political parties
making up the governing coalition, and is an
ingenious Malaysian compromise with com-
munally-based political parties giving each a place
in government. This is an extension of the old
coalition of the United Malays National Organ-
isation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Associa-
tion (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress
(MIC) that has dominated Malaysian politics since
independence. Razak extended this to form the
Barisan by inviting a number of other parties to
join the governing coalition. UMNO was parti-
cularly interested in incorporating the Pan-
Malayan Islamic Party (PAS) which had made
considerable inroads into Malay support for
UMNO particularly in the east coast states.5 The
4 It is fairly clear that delegation was not one of Razak's
adminlitrative skills, and his severe illness may well have
delayed important sections of the Pian.
5 A number of smaller parties are also members of the BN
such as the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and the
Gerakin Ra'ayat Malaysia (Malaysian Peoples Movement).
BN has clearly strengthened the government in
electoral terms, but the coalition is not without
tensions, particularly PAS demands for the ex-
pansion of privileges to Malays. PAS continues
to pose a threat to UMNO and competition for
Malay loyalties has not ended with the formation
of the Barisan Nasional.6
The plan itself is revealing in that it highlights
many of the debates within the governing coali-
tion and the strength of the various trends par-
ticularly within the senior partner UMNO. I
will analyse these factors by examining the plan
under the following general headings: the New
Economic Policy; poverty eradication; racial
economic balance in employment and ownership;
and education.
The New Economic Policy
The race riots of May, 1969, continue to cast a
dark shadow over Malaysia. It is not the intention
here to attribute blame, as the most terrible acts
of violence were perpetrated by both sides, al-
though the majority of those who lost their lives
were Chinese. The government officially blamed
Communists and the Opposition for creating the
atmosphere which resulted in the violence, but
few people take that as a serious explanation.
Considerable official effort went into the task of
avoiding a repeat of May, 1969, and the Second
Malaysia Plan (SMP) 1971-75, was built around
what was termed the New Economic Policy. The
policies incorporated into the SMP had as their
two main objectives the eradication of poverty
among all Malaysians irrespective of race, and
the restructuring of society so that identification
of race with economic function and geographical
location could be reduced and eventually elimi-
nated. The political significance of such objectives
needs careful attention because of the policy ques-
tions raised by these aims: how can such objec-
tives be translated into hard policies? This prob-
lem has remained for Malaysian policy-makers
and dominates planning within the TMP period
1976-80.
Malaysian society is characterised by great pover-
ty and great affluence, with the rural sector con-
taining the bulk of the country's poor. This is
further complicated by the fact that it is the
Malays who form the vast majority of rural
dwellers. Despite the fact that UMNO has domi-
nated the governments of the post-independence
period, rural poverty remains, and according to
some economists is getting worse. Increasingly
UMNO is facing pressure from within the Malay
6 Opposition to EN has been reduced to the small and pre-
dominantly Chinese Democratic Action Party (DAP).
community to attack the problems of rural pover-
ty. The success of the 'fundamentalist' PAS in
the rural east coast states has shaken UMNO
control over the Malay rural voter, and Malays
are examining the position of their community
vis-à-vis the whole society, particularly their posi-
tion as the indigenous people. (Malays, along
with the small groups of aboriginal peoples,
regard themselves as the indigenous population,
with the Chinese and Indians as immigrants now
enjoying citizenship.) Malays have what are called
'special rights', that is certain privileges such as
preference in recruitment to the civil service
where a quota of four Malays to one non-Malay
operates, quotas in scholarships to educational
institutions, the preservation of the rights of the
Malay traditional rulers (Sultans), Islam as the
national religion, Bahasa Malaysia as the national
language and a favourable system of granting
licences in road transport, government contracts,
etc. Political parties representing the other racial
groups have accepted that Malays should pre-
dominate in the distribution of political posts
within government, and the rural areas are given
special weighting in Parliamentary constituency
boundaries to ensure 'over-representation' of rural
members in Parliament. The major policy-making
posts in the civil service are dominated by
Malays, suggesting that the quota system may
also be applied to promotion as well as recruit-
ment. The government has then come to be re-
garded by Malays as a protector of their privi-
leges, and pressure is constantly applied for the
extension of government efforts on behalf of
the Malays.
The question of Malay 'special rights' is one
of the most sensitive issues in Malaysian politics.
Although certain of these rights are now en-
trenched in the Constitution and discussion of
them can lead to arrest, the government has been
unable to take the question out of polities. Within
UMNO there is constant debate between those
who wish to see the extension of special rights
and those who feel that whatever national unity
has been achieved since 1969 may be destroyed
by excessive Malay demands. The TMP is clearly
another major restatement of the objectives of
the NEP (paras 1 to 38), but with sorne changes
of emphasis.
Poverty eradiction
The government sees the problem of poverty as
essentially a rural problem, although the plan
indicates that urban problems are also being given
attention. Per capita income by race testifies to
the position of the Malays, who receive an
average $34 per month, compared with $68 per
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month for the Chinese and $57 per month for the
Indians (para 20).
Figures such as these are the 'stuff' of political
debate among Malays. Failure to make serious
inroads into Malay poverty, and the contrast
with the Chinese and Indians, provided political
capital for the PAS. However, the plan admits
that the above figures, whilst revealing, tell only
part of the story. There are poor of all races
and if national unity is to grow, then poverty
amongst the Chinese and Indians must be given
attention. It may well be this desire to meet the
needs of the poor of all communities that the
present Prime Minister, Hussein Onn, sought to
emphasise after Razak's death. This would cer-
tainly fit with Hussein Onn's known political
views and his actions since January, 1976. He is
known to dislike the more extreme expressions
of Malay chauvinism and has not been afraid to
move against corruption within the UMNO
leadership. The arrest and trial of the former
Chief Minister of Selangor, Datuk Harun, who
has a massive following within UMNO, shows a
side of the Prime Minister's character not pre-
viously appreciated. Hussein Onn is widely be-
lieved to have warned other Chief Ministers of
the states within the Federation that present
levels of corruption are not acceptable.
The TMP states that the largest poverty groups
are the rubber, padi and coconut small-holders
(predominantly Malay), the estate workers
(Indians and some Chinese), agricultural labourers
(all races) and the inhabitants of the New
Villages7 (paras. 494-6). The Leader of the Opposi-
tion, Lim Kit Siang, stated in Parliament that
Malaysian policy-makers had at last recognised
the plight of the inhabitants of the New Villages
and the estate workers who constitute the hard
core of the non-Malay poor.
This significant change of emphasis from Malay
poverty to poverty in general has considerable
political importance. It is not by general state-
ment of objectives but by translation into policies
that the plan must be judged. Development ex-
penditure is expected to double during the plan
period, with argiculture taking 25.5 per cent of
the total. The ability of the bureaucracy and the
various statutory bodies to increase production
and productivity in the small-holder sector is
probably the key to the bulk of Malay rural
poverty. Malaysia also has a reservoir of virgin
land for development and the Federal Land
Development Authority (FELDA) opened up
7 The New Villages were created by the British during the
Bmergency whtch lasted until 1960, in order to cut off
'upplies of food, manpower and information from the
Communist forces. Some thousands of rural Chinese were
settled in these villages.
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412,000 acres (para. 900) in the period of the
SMP, although this is calculated to fall to 350,000
acres for the TMP period (para. 976). The open-
ing up of virgin land is expensive but it does
have the advantage of minimising conflicts with
entrenched rural power groups. The vast majority
of the settlers in FELDA schemes are Malays,
although there are Chinese to be found in, for
example, the schemes in the state of Malacca.
Land is not a Federal matter, but a jealously
guarded prerogative of the individual states. There
have been criticisms voiced that state governments
will not surrender land to New Village Chinese,
and FELDA must go to the individual state
governments when it wants to open new schemes.
The TMP admits that there is a lack of land for
the residents of the New Villages, but there is
an ominous silence on how land is to be made
available (paras. 542-4).
The plan admits that poverty has grown among
estate workers, many of whom are Indians, but
the proposals for dealing with this are conserva-
tive to say the least. The government appears
to be unwilling to compel the estates to improve
conditions (paras. 539-41). Even a recently signed
wages agreement between the National Union
of Plantation Workers and the Malayan Agri-
cultural Producers Association has not pleased
many estate workers.8
The plan indicates a willingness on the part of
Federal decision-makers to recognise the existence
of poverty in all communities. The emphasis on
this point is clearly a victory for the new Prime
Minister's view, but considerable problems remain
in the area of policy. Movement of rural dwellers
into new land development schemes would cer-
tainly assist, but land schemes, particularly those
operated by FELDA, are extremely expensive.
Land needs to be made available to the Chinese
and Indians in greater quantities than in the past,
and the development of rural-based industries
can assist all races to move from low to high
productivity sectors.
Urban problems are also given attention in the
pian, and urban unemployment remains a feature
of the economy. The plan places great faith in
the private sector and manufacturing is expected
to produce 22.9 per cent of the 742,800 new jobs
needed over the next five years, thus reducing
unemployment from its present 7.1 per cent to
6 per cent.
Racial economic balance
The second objective of the NEP is the restruc-
turing of society so as to eliminate the identifi-
cation of race with economic functions. This
8 See Far Eastern Economic Review, July 16, 1976.
poses a delicate political problem for the planners
and policy-makers. A restructuring would involve
the employment of far more Malays in industry
and commerce at all levels, and a growth in
Malay participation in the private sector through
ownership of share capital, business firms, etc.
Chinese control over the indigenous private sector
and their overwhelming hold over managerial and
technical positions within this sector raises the
question of the restructuring strategy. The 'second'
partner in the coalition, the Malaysian Chinese
Association (MCA) is only too aware that if a
strategy of redistribution were adopted then it
would clearly mean an attack on the economically
WESTERN MALAYSIA
The East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak
have been excluded from this map.
powerful sections of the Chinese community.
Malay critics of UMNO have constantly attacked
the Malay political leadership for subscribing to
continued Chinese control in the industrial and
commercial sectors. Tunku Abdul Rahman,
Malaysia's first Prime Minister, was attacked by
Malay 'ultras'9 for being 'soft' with the Chinese
9 The English term to describe Malaya who subscribe to the
view that Malaya ought to occupy the major positions in all
aspects of Malaysian society.
and demands were voiced for his resignation after
the 1969 riots (Slimming, 1969: 66-73).
There can be little doubt that the MCA leverage
within the coalition continues to concentrate on
ensuring that redistribution is kept to a minimum
this is the price of the preservation of the
coalition in its present form. The section of the
TMP dealing with racial economic balance reflects
the ability of the MCA to covenant their con-
tinued support for the coalition in return for the
preservation of the position and interests of
Chinese entrepreneurs and managers. The 'ultras'
and the PAS have failed to carry the debate
within the coalition. Hussein Onn has identified
himself with the 'moderates' in UMNO who
argue that upsetting the rich Chinese would be
a mistake in the long run, because it would
frighten investors, both indigenous and foreign,
on whom so much of the planned expansion of
the private sector depends (paras. 841-85), and
strain the loyalty of many Chinese to the concept
of a unified Malaysian nation. The security di-
mension was probably imported into the debate,
particularly by one of Hussein Onn's supporters,
Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, the Minister of Home
Affairs and Internal Security, who no doubt re-
minded the ultras of the dangers of alienating
the rich Chinese at a time when Communist acti-
vity is growing in the urban areas.
The strategy adopted by the planners is to
place the restructuring objectives within a con-
text of economic expansion, coupled with the
formation of various financial institutions to buy
share capital and hold it in trust for the Bumi-
putras,'° who are urged to save and so purchase
the shares. There is also to be an increase in
technical and managerial training for Malays to
increase their job competitiveness. The govern-
ment has created a vast array of statutory bodies
to participate in the programme of restructuring
ownership and to date they hold $541m of cor-
porate stock (paras. 583-610). There are preferen-
ces given to Malays in the areas of government
contracts, supplies and the award of transport
licences. This institutional tinkering is hardly
likely to change the balance seriously in the
short term, and the long-term prospects depend
on growth within the economy, over which the
government has only part control. The strategy
is best summed up in paragraph 569 of the plan:
"Thus it is important that in the implementation
of the specific measures for employment and
ownership restructuring, the investment climate
and the prospects for overall economic growth
10 Literally 'sons of the soil' i.e., Malaya.
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should be strengthened, for the underlying objec-
tive remains that of fair distribution through
rapid economic growth so that no one will be
deprived of his rights, privileges, income, job
or opportunities." That could weil have been
written by the MCA leaders.
Education
Educational advance in Malaysia in terms of
investment continues to be a feature of total
government spending, and the proportion of de-
velopment spending devoted to education for the
plan period is 9.0 per cent as opposed to actual
expenditure of 6.9 per cent during the Second
Malaysia Plan. Two contentious issues require
examination in the context of educational plan-
ning, namely, the language issue and racial
balance of scholarships in tertiary educational
institutions in Malaysia and overseas. These issues
are directly linked, and provide an interesting
insight into the power configurations within the
coalition.
In furthering national unity, Bahasa Malaysia
will increasingly become the language of instruc-
tion at all levels. The SMP period saw the ex-
tension of Bahasa Malaysia at primary level and
it is claimed that this is the language of instruc-
tion in all English medium schools. However,
the status of English raises many issues for
Malaysian development. The plan states that
English will be extended as a "strong second
language" (para. 1310). The present Minister of
Education, Dr. Mahathir Mohammed, who hap-
pens also to be the Deputy Prime Minister, has
in the past leaned to the 'ultra' position on some
issues (although office and his proximity to the
Prime Ministership has probably moderated his
views) and he is a keen proponent of the con-
tinued progress of Bahasa Malaysia. The policy
is not without its problems: for example, Eng-
lish is essential for managerial, technical and
administrative positions within the economy. Poor
Malays are .at a disadvantage as English teaching
in many rural schools is poor and popularly
believed to be declining in quality. This is not
assisted by the habit of the elite of all communi-
ties of sending their children abroad, particularly
to Britain, for their educaticrn. The Opposition
leader, Lini Kit Siang, constantly reminds Malay
proponents of Bahasa of the numbers of Minis-
terial children at present at educational estab-
lishments in the English speaking world. As one
Malay critic of the language policy remarked,
"I wonder how much Bahasa Ministers' children
learn in London." Entry into whole areas of the
modern sector of the economy requires English,
and many M&lays recognise that the actions of
44
the Malay political leadership are not without a
tinge of hypocrisy.
The second educational issue is the award of
scholarships to various higher education institu-
tions in Malaysia and abroad. Special rights for
Malays extend to the award of scholarships and
places in such institutions as the Universities.
This has the effect of making competition for
non-Malay places extremely keen and resulting
in higher entry requirements for non-Malays.
Sons and daughters of the rich are able to pur-
chase higher education by going abroad and at
present there are 31,50011 Malaysians studying
in overseas countries (paras. 1372 and 1382).
Statistics on the racial balance are not readily
available, but 4,005 Malaysians were in tertiary
institutions in Britain, Australia and New
Zealand in 1975. Of this figure, 20 per cent were
Malays and other 'indigenous' people, 69 per
cent Chinese and 9.2 per cent Indian. The
figure for Chinese probably represents a con-
siderable investment by individual Chinese fami-
lies and organisations in response to the quota
system in operation for indigenous tertiary insti-
tutions.
Poor non-Malays have to contend with the dual
disadvantage of poverty and the quota system,
and there is little evidence that the educational
authorities discriminate in their favour. One of
the most depressing aspects of Malaysia is the
difficulty of convincing many Malays that poverty
exists within the Chinese community,12 and poli-
cies that discriminate against the community as
a whole on the basis of a myth that all Chinese
are affluent is hardly likely to build national
unity.
The two aspects of educational policy examined
here reveal a political naivety among Malaysian
policy-makers, at least in their statements for
public consumption. There is excessive reliance
on language as a means of building national
unity. The determination of th elite to ensure
education in English for their children raises
smiles on the faces of all informed Malaysians
irrespective of community, but the language ques-
tion requires a set of policies more subtle and
at the same time politically more astute. Chinese
educationalists emphasise the importance of Eng-
lish as a means of entering the modern sector
and this factor is recognised by the rich in all
communities, which partly explains the demand
for overseas education.
11 The figure includes students at secondary schools abroad.12 It seemed to me that there was greater appreciation of
poverty within the Indian community, but Indians have
very little 'political muscle' and therefore pose little threat
to the Malays.
Space does not permit mention of a number of
other issues in educational development that re-
quire examination, for example, the relationship
between the restructuring aspects of NEP and the
racial balance within subject areas. The section
of the TMP on education (Chapter xxii) does
not indicate an awareness among planners and
policy-makers of the consequences of present
policies. The emphasis on Bahasa Malaysia has
become a 'sacred cow' of the Malay political
leadership, but the creation of a national lan-
guage has costs. It is difficult not to conclude
that these costs are being borne by the less
affluent sections of all communities because they
rely on the educational system within Malaysia.
It is clear that within the coalition the MCA
has not been able (on the present evidence) to
point to the dangers in educational policies. This
may well reflect the fact that the MCA is much
more interested in Chinese industrial and com-
mercial interests and the demands of the Chinese
poor are not of vital concern to the party.
Conclusion
The Third Malaysia Plan is a substantial docu-
ment in length and scope. The targets for growth
in the economy are considerable but provided
there is no massive world recession, then the tar-
gets will probably be achieved. Important as these
targets are, it is in many ways the political aspects
of the plan that are of interest. The TMP is
obviously directly descended from the SMP but
with certain changes of emphasis, particularly in
the thinking on poverty and this reflects a fear
that haunts the Malay political leadershipa
divided Malay race. The major gains for Malays
from the NEP have been excessively concentrated
in the more affluent sections of the community.
The life-style of the political and administrative
elite in Kuala Lumpur contrasts with the lot of
the urban and rural poor. This stratification could,
in the future, be 'politicised', either by the Party
Islam (PAS) into a chauvinistic demand for a
Malay polity, thus taking the country towards
a racial war or to the Left and the development
of a nascent class consciousness cutting across
the racial divide. Were either of these situations
to develop UMNO would fall apart. UMNO
must therefore play the difficult game of beating
the racial drum loud enough to deflect the attacks
from the PAS at the same time not too loud
so as to destroy the coalition particularly with
the MCA.
In UMNO's favour is the fact that the Malays
are the least class conscious of the three commu-
nities. Malay response to their position is to
demand more privileges, which means more
government assistance. UMNO being the major
political force is able to provide at least some
of this and therefore obtains credit (and votes)
from the Malay community. However, can the
Malay political leadership rely on this situation
lasting?
Finally, one issue that is now once again at the
forefront of Malaysian politics is the internal
security and the activities of the Communist Party
of Malaya (CPM). After their defeat during the
1948-60 Emergency the remnants of the party
continued to operate, but infiltration and splits
weakened their mobilising and guerrilla opera-
tions. However events in the east of South East
Asia and a resurgence of activity poses problems
for the government. UMNO has seized the issue
to emphasise the need for the unity of the Malay
people, and Hussein Onn has gained politically
as the Prime Minister facing the threat. Actual
hard information is difficult to come by, but
defence and internal security expenditure is to
double during the plan period (Table 12-3, pp.
240-4 1). If volume of newspaper articles and
speeches by politicians is anything to go by then
CPM activity must have grown in the last year.
An examination of these articles and speeches
exposes concern over the political work among
the civilian population. Could it be that the CPM
is recruiting from the Malay community as well
as their known support from some Chinese?
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